The propositional language extended by two families of unary propositional probability operators and the corresponding list of probability measure axioms concerning those operators is the basis of the system preseted here. We describe a Kripke-type possible worlds semantics covering such a kind of logical systems. 1 Keywords: probability measure, superintuitionistic logic, Kripke model, completeness
The central point of this short note is the treatment of a propositional calculus by means of probability truthfulness of arbitrary formula in the context of considered calculus. Roughly speaking, the idea is to extend the propositional language by a kind of probability operators and then add the corresponding probability axioms to some propositional or modal logic. Simply, we adapt the Keisler's axioms (see 2]), related to the probability quanti ers, for use in the case of propositional language and extend a propositional non-classical logic by those new axioms. In such a way the logical system obtained may be considered as a kind of polymodal logic. In this article we present the basic de nitions and results regarding that approach and their extensive version can be found in 1].
Our system is based on the language consisting of the usual symbols for logical connectives, denumerable set of propositional letters, parentheses and two types of probability operators: r and r , for each r 2 S, where S is a nite subset of the real interval 0; 1], such that 0; 1 2 S and S is closed for +, where, e.g., in the case when r + s > 1, for r + s we take 1 (or, more generally, S can be any nite lattice with zero 0, unit 1 and join operation denoted by +). The set of formulae is de ned inductively as the smallest set containing propositional letters and closed under formation rules: Note that the rule ( 1 ) can be considered as the usual modal logic rule of necessitation.
The notions of derivation from hypotheses in L p are de ned as usual. If ? is a set of formulae, then we say that a formula A is derivable from ? in L p and write ?`L p A i there is a nite sequence of formulae B 1 ; :::; B n such that A = B n and every formula of this sequence is either a theorem of L p , or belongs to ?, or is obtained by the modus ponens rule from the formulae preceding it in the sequence. It is not di cult, by induction on the length of the derivation, to prove that the Deduction Theorem holds for our system. Now, we are giving a brief review of the Kripke-type semantics for the system just de ned.
We suppose that a xed superintuitionistic logic L is complete and sound with respect to a class of Kripke models. x j = P iff x 2 v(P) x j = B^C iff x j = B & x j = C x j = B _ C iff x j = B or x j = C x j = B ! C iff (8y 2 W)(xRy&y j = B ) y j = C) x j = :B iff (8y 2 W)(xRy ) not y j = B) x j = r B iff p ? (y; fzjz j = Bg) r x j = r B iff (8y 2 W)(xRy ) p ? (y; fzjz j = Bg) r) where we suppose that, for every formula A, the set fyjy j = Ag is both p ? (x; :) and p ? (x; :)-measurable, for any x 2 W. We say that A holds in a model M, denoted by M j = A, i for any x 2 W, x j = A. We simply write j = A and say that A is L p -valid i for every L p -model M, M j = A. In the sequel of this paper we shall use abbreviations p ? (x; B) and p ? (x; B) for p ? (x; fyjy j = Bg) and p ? (x; fyjy j = Bg), respectively.
Note that the last two claims of the preceding de nition, concerning the operators r and r , reminds to the treatment of modalities in the corresponding context. Now, following a usual procedure, we are going to sketch the basic steps of the proof that L p is sound and complete with respect to the class of L p -models. The canonical L p -model is an L p -model. Lemma 0.5 In the canonical L p -model, for every formula A and every ? 2 X c , ? j = A iff A 2 ?
Proof. By induction on the complexity of A.
Finally, we formulate our main result: Theorem 0.6 (Completenes and Soundness Theorem) For any formula A, A is provable in L p i A is L p -valid.
